From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~yarmo/keyoxide-devel
Michael, Not sure if you're still following Keyoxide but I think you'd be glad to hear that "metacode.biz" is no more! The Keyoxide people launched a new project for working on the "spec" side of proofs: https://ariadne.id/ (the "Keyoxide" name refers to the frontend mostly now, as far as I understand). You can see their announcement post here: https://blog.keyoxide.org/ariadne-spec/ Aaaand... I guess that's it... have a nice day! 👋
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~rjarry/aerc-devel
Hi Robin, I *accept* the change of license from MIT to GPL for my changes in the aerc project. Have a nice day! Kind regards, Wiktor On 20.02.2023 18:59, Robin Jarry wrote: > Hi all, > > as you may know, aerc is currently distributed under the MIT license.
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~yarmo/keyoxide-devel
Hi Michael, > Thanks for designing all of this btw! :) Haha, no problem! Actually I'd pass all credit to Vincent Breitmoser (of OpenKeychain) for the design of Linked Identities [0]. I just took his idea and made it easier for the users :) [0]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vb-openpgp-linked-ids-01 > I wasn't aware of that part (everyone wanting their own domain). > I'm also not sure how this went from > https://github.com/wiktor-k/openpgp-proofs to Keyoxide (if Keyoxide is > considered the official successor or if it's more like an "alternative"
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~yarmo/keyoxide-devel
Hi Michael, I've designed the original `proof@metacode.biz` notation. I see you've pieced the history nicely together. Just for posterity's sake I also had a different design using User IDs: https://github.com/wiktor-k/distributed-ids And to be completely transparent I based my design on Linked Identities that OpenKeychain once had: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vb-openpgp-linked-ids-01 Sadly it was removed because no-one used it: https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/pull/2408
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~yarmo/keyoxide-devel
Hi Yarmo! It appears to be working :) Kind regards, Wiktor
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~sircmpwn/aerc
On 23.02.2020 09:18, Amir Yalon wrote: > Curious to know – was this in response to https://todo.sr.ht/~sircmpwn/aerc2/348 > (Crash on embedded terminal mouse scroll event), or was it unrelated? To be honest I first saw your issue, tried to reproduce it, but then found a different bug (that looked similar) and fixed that one. I should've attached the stacktrace to my commit as it shows the panic comes from a different part of code (msglist.go) that your trace doesn't have. I do suspect that fix to your code should also be simple if != nil in the line that the stacktrace shows. If you're interested in fixing it I'd recommend building from source, reproducing, checking the exact
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~sircmpwn/aerc
Using mouse scroll before messages load will trigger a panic as `ml.store` has not been assigned yet and is `nil`. --- widgets/msglist.go | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/widgets/msglist.go b/widgets/msglist.go index 9aff0d4..51c133c 100644 --- a/widgets/msglist.go +++ b/widgets/msglist.go @@ -163,10 +163,14 @@ func (ml *MessageList) MouseEvent(localX int, localY int, event tcell.Event) { ml.aerc.NewTab(viewer, msg.Envelope.Subject) } case tcell.WheelDown: [message trimmed]
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~sircmpwn/aerc
Pressing `Enter` on a view that has not yet loaded messages (e.g. at startup) would return `nil` from `Selected()`. Accessing `msg.Uid` on a `nil` reference crashes aerc. This patch moves the `msg == nil` check before accessing `msg.Uid` thus avoiding the crash. To test this patch repeatedly press `Enter` on startup. --- commands/account/view.go | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/commands/account/view.go b/commands/account/view.go index b287406..aab9052 100644 [message trimmed]
From Wiktor Kwapisiewicz to ~sircmpwn/sr.ht-dev
One more thing (sorry for the reply spam): > +add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" always; "preload" can be dangerous if enabled on a whim: https://hstspreload.org/#opt-in Preload + hstspreload.org submission will make browsers *always* use HTTPS for sr.ht + subdomains with no workaround (if cert is invalid there won't be a "load site anyway" button in the browser UI). In 2019 SSL certs are available for free so it's not a big problem but I think it's good to point out the ramifications of this process: removing